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The Nature of
Aboriginal Title
BRIAN SLATTERY

Introduction

The concept of aboriginal title is an autonomous concept of Canadian
common law that bridges the gulf between aboriginal land systems and
imported European land systems. 1 It does not stem from aboriginal
customary law, English common law or French civil law. It coordinates
the interaction between these systems, without forming part of them. 2
Aboriginal title is thus a sui generis concept-one that does not fit into
pre-existing legal categories. 3
The unique character of aboriginal title is explained by the distinctive history of aboriginal lands in North America during the formative
era extending into the nineteenth century. This history can be divided
into four phases:
(1) the period prior to European contact, when aboriginal peoples
were independent political entities with international title to their
territories;
(2) the period of contact, when European states launched exploratory
voyages and issued Charters embodying territorial claims;
Notes will be found on pages 27-33.
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(3) the period of initial settlement, when permanent European colonies were established and inter-European treaties were concluded,
delimiting the boundaries of exclusive colonial spheres; and
(4) the period of imperial expansion, during which Crown suzerainty
was gradually extended over aboriginal nations and a constitutional framework emerged that embraced both settler communities
and aboriginal peoples.
Before Europeans came to North America, the indigenous peoples
of the continent were independent entities, holding international title
to the lands in their possession. 4 However, the map of North America,
like that of Europe, was far from static. The boundaries between aboriginal groups shifted over time and groups migrated in response to
such factors as war, epidemic, famine, dwindling game reserves, altered
soil conditions, internal conflict and population pressure. Lands that
were vacant at one period were later occupied. The identities of the
groups themselves changed, as communities dissolved or coalesced
and new ones emerged. 5
Far from ending this fluidity, the arrival of Europeans often magnified it, as novel technologies, diseases, alliances and trade opportunities upset existing balances of power and stimulated fresh forms of
competition and conflict. For ~xample, the well-known wars of the Iroquois against their aboriginal neighbours in the seventeenth century
were partly spurred by the European fur trade. The introduction of the
horse and firearms to the Western plains gave rise to new and more
mobile styles of life among the Western Indians, which ironically are
often taken to exemplify traditional Indian culture. 6
The early territorial claims launched by European powers had little
basis in reality and had no impact on the territorial rights of indigenous
American peoples. Nor did the advent of Europeans have the legal effect of confining aboriginal peoples to the lands they happened to possess at the time of contact, or prevent them from acquiring new lands
in the future. Most of the continent remained an area open to movement and change, where the title of an aboriginal group rested on longstanding possession or agreement with other groups, and territory was
gained and lost by appropriation, agreement or abandonment.
Nevertheless, the situation changed gradually as the colonial powers concluded treaties among themselves, sorting out their territorial
claims inter se. While these treaties could not bind indigenous groups
that were not parties, they had the effect of designating exclusive European spheres of influence in America and progressively reduced aboriginal opportunities for wider international contacts. This was
particularly true in the period following the Treaty of Paris in 1763, when
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France and Spain withdrew from the eastern and northern sectors of
North America, leaving Britain free to pursue its imperial enterprises
there. Henceforth, the British Crown and its successors, the United
States and Canada, asserted exclusive rights to maintain relations with
the aboriginal peoples occupying the territories in question: in particular to conclude treaties with them, to secure suzerainty over them and
to obtain cessions of their lam;ls.
Restrictions on the cessioh of ah~riginal lands arose from another
source. The English-style lanq! systems prevailing in the colonies had
one common characteristic. They were based on the premise that title ·
to land, so far as the settlers were concerned, could only be secured by
grant from the Crown or its deputies. It followed that private settlers
could not gain title by simply settling on the land or purchasing it from
the indigenous peoples. In theory, at least, this rule ensured that the
Crown retained control over the pace and manner in which land was
settled and that the Crown benefited from any revenues flowing from
land grants. The restriction also helped to abate the fraudulent practices that often tainted private purchases of Indian lands. 7
In various stages, the Crown made good its claims over the territories now making up Canada and brought aboriginal peoples under its
protection. This process had several legal consequences for aboriginal
land rights. 8 First, ~p_d~r B.!itJsliJa~,_ the_C_!own _gained the ultimate title ~o the lands_h~~4: by ab_o~iginal peoples, as it did-to affiands .in newly
acg_ui~d~.§lo~i~U~-~r-~t()~i~s_._ ,This effect flowed-frorri tlie fot1dar character of the British constitution, whereby the Crown was not only sovereign of the realm but also supreme landlord. 9 Second, the territorial
title of an aboriginal group became a communal title at common law
that formed a burden on the Crown's ultimate title and gave the aboriginal group the right to the exclusive use and occupation of their lands
for a broad range of purposes. Third, aboriginal title could not be transferred or sold to private individuals; it could only be ceded to the
Crown. As just noted, this restriction stemmed largely from the feudal
systems of tenure imported into the colonies and from a desire to prevent fraudulent land transactions. 1°Finally, under the shelter of aboriginal title, customary land systems remained in force within aboriginal
communities and governed the relations of their members among
themselves.

Character of Aboriginal Ti tie
The basic attributes of aboriginal title were identified in the leading
case of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, decided by the Supreme Court
of Canada in 1997.11 The case involved a claim by hereditary chiefs of
the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples to separate portions of a tract
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encompassing 58,000 square kilometres in northern British Columbia.
Their claim was originally for "ownership" and "jurisdiction"; however
by the time the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, it had become mainly a claim for aboriginal title. 12
Strikingly different conceptions of aboriginal title were advanced
before the Court. The aboriginal parties argued that aboriginal title was
equivalent to an inalienable fee simple. By contrast, the governments
of Canada and British Columbia maintained that aboriginal title was
simply a bundle of particular rights to engage in specific culture-based
activities on the land, or alternafely the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land in order to engage ii) such specific activities. 13
These differing approaches merit closer examination.
According to the aboriginal parties, aboriginal title was similar to
a fee simple, which is the largest possible form of land title known to
English common law. 14 Most lands held by private parties in Canada
(outside Quebec) are held in fee simple. A person who holds a fee simple on land is for all practical purposes the absolute owner of the land,
or at least as close to being absolute owner as English common law permits. In theory, under the English doctrine of tenures, all lands owned
by private individuals are held of the Crown, which has the underlying
and ultimate title to the land. The main practical significance of the
Crown's ultimate title is that the land reverts to the Crown if the owner
dies without leaving an heir to the estate (a process known"as "escheat"). The aboriginal parties argued that a group holding aboriginal
title was the effective "fee simple" owner of its lands, with the right to
use them for any purpose it saw fit. However, aboriginal title differed
from a fee simple in one major respect: it could not be transferred to
private parties but could only be surrendered to the Crown.
The Canadian and British Columbia governments rejected this
model and argued that aboriginal title was at best a bundle of particular
aboriginal rights. This bundle would allow an aboriginal group to engage in a range of specific activities on the land, and it might also give
the group the exclusive right to use and occupy the land for those specific purposes. However, aboriginal title would not enable the group to
use the land for any purpose it saw fit. The group would be limited to
performing the particular activities forming part of the bundle. 15 Moreover, the group would have to show that each activity in the bundle was
itself an aboriginal right-that is, an element of a practice, custom or
tradition that was integral to the group's distinctive society at the time
of European contact. 16 1
So, according to the governmental argument, the content of aboriginal title was variable. It differed from aboriginal group to aboriginal
group, depending on the group's cultural practices at the time of Euro-
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pean contact. By contrast, the aboriginal parties argued that the content of aboriginal title was uniform and did not depend on historical
practices. If a group had aboriginal title, it could use the land as it
wished, subject only to the rule prohibiting transfers to third parties.
In its judgment, the Supreme Court rejected the governmental argument and adopted a position close to that advocated by the aboriginal parties. The Court begins its analysis with the century-old St.
Catherine's Millj_ng case, 17 where the Privy Council famously characterized a5orfgfiial title as a "personal and usufructuary right." This perplexing formula had bedeviled the case law ever since, spawning
unhelpful analogies with the concept of usufruct in Roman, French and
even Scottish law. The Supreme Court takes the opportunity to give the
formula a decent burial, observing that the Privy Council's choice of
terminology was "not particularly helpful to explain the various dimensions of aboriginal title. " 18 So doing, the Court opens the way to a clearer and more accurate characterization of aboriginal title.
Following in the footsteps of Justice Dickson in the Guerin case, 19
the Supreme Court points out that aboriginal title is a sui.generis land
right. As such, it is a unique right that does not correspond to the categories known to English common law or French civil law. Neither can
it be understood simply in terms of aboriginal legal systems. It has to
be viewed from both aboriginal and non-aboriginal perspectives. 20
Aboriginal title has three basic features that differentiate it from
ordinary titles held under common or civil law. First, aboriginal title is
inalienable. It cannot be sold or transferred directly to private third par- ·
ties. It can only be surrendered to the Crown, which in turn may grant
it to third parties. However, the fact that aboriginal title is inalienable
(and so "personal" to the holding group) does not mean that it is a nonproprietary interest like a licence to use and occupy the land, which
cannot compete on an equal footing with ordinary land rights under
English or French law. 21 Aboriginal title is a true property right. In effect, then, the Court rejects the notion that alienability is a necessary
feature of a property right. This notion stems from European property
systems and has no application to aboriginal title.
The second distinctive feature of aboriginal title is..its. source. Under English property law, all lands in the hands of private parties are in
principle held of the Crown either mediately or immediately, by virtue
of a legal fiction positing that the Crown was the original owner of all
lands in the realm. 22 Influenced perhaps by this conception, the Privy
Council in St. Catherine's had suggested that the source of aboriginal title in Canada was the Royal Proclamation of 1763, issued following the
cession of New France to Great Britain. 23 However, this approach implied that aboriginal land rights did not exist unless recognized by the
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Crown. In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court disclaims this approach and
holds that, while the Royal Proclamation recognizes aboriginal title, it
does not bring it into being. In the Court's view, aboriginal title arises
from the prior occupation of Canada by aboriginal peoples, and from
the interaction between the incoming common law and pre-existing
systems of aboriginal law. In effect, aboriginal title stems from possession before the advent of the Crown. 24
A third distinctive feature of aboriginal title is its communal nature. As ~hief Justice Lamer explains:
Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual aboriginal persons; it
is a collective right to land held by all members of an aboriginal nation. Decisions with respect to that land are also made by that
community. 25
Although the Chief]ustice does not elaborate on this point, it has several important ramifications. First, any decision to surrender aboriginal title to the Crown must be a communal one, made by the
aboriginal group as a whole. It is not possible for a single individual or
collection of individuals (such as a particular "chief' or "chiefs") to
dispose of communal lands apart from group consent. The requirement of group consent is a uniform rule of Canadian common law that
does not vary from group to group in accordance with local custom.
This inference is supported by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which
provides that Indian lands shall be purchased orily by the Crown "at
some publick Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians." Moreover, as
a matter of policy, it would be undesirable for the validity of a land surrender to depend on the vagaries of local customary law, which would
often be unknown to the Crown parties and in any case might not contemplate land transfers.
The communal character of aboriginal title has a second ramification. The internal law of the group governs the manner in which group
members share the land among themselves, unless this law has been
modified by statute or other means. So, in effect, the concept of aboriginal title supplies a protective legal umbrella, in the shelter of which the
cus~omary law of an aboriginal group may develop an~ flourish.
__ ... - ··· ··A third ramification may be noted. Since decisions about the use
and disposal of aboriginal lands must be made communally, there has
to be some in!_e_n:ial mechanism for c01nmu_I!al_qecision-ma~jpg. The
need for such a mechanism is one of the cornerstories--ofthe right of
self-government. At a minimum, an aboriginal group has the inherent
right to make communal decisions about how its lands are to be used
and by whom. As the Supreme Court observes:
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the common law should develop to recognize aboriginal rights
(and title, when necessary) as they were recognized by either de
facto practice or by the aboriginal system of governance. 26
In particular, the group has the right to decide how the lands are to be
shared among group members; to make grants' and other dispositions
of the communal property; to lay down laws and regulations governing
use of the lands; to impose taxes relating to the land; and to determine
how any land taxes and revenues are to be used and distributed.

Scope of Aboriginal Title
In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court holds that the scope of aboriginal
title is governed by two basic principles. First, aboriginal title confers a
right to the exclusive use and occupation of the land for a broad range
of purposes, which are not limited to the practices, customs and traditions of the group at the time of contact or any other historical period. 27
Nevertheless, under the second principle, the uses that an aboriginal
group makes of its land must not pe irreconcilable with the nature of
the group's attachment to the lan&' Dn this point, aboriginal title differs from a fee simple, which allows the land to be used for any purpose
whatsoever. Let us consider these principles more closely.
1. Exclusive use and occupation
Aboriginal title confers the right to the exclusive use and occupation of
the land for a broad range of purposes. This explicit holding in Delgamuukw is the culmination of a series of observations made in previous
Supreme Court rulings. Notably, in Guerin, justice Dickson held that
aboriginal title is "a unique interest in land" which encompasses "a legal right to occupy and possess certain lands,"28 which implies a right
to use the land for more than traditional or customary purposes.Justice
Dickson also held that the interest of an Indian band in a reserve is the
same as aboriginal title in traditional tribal lands. 29 So, the law governing reserve lands presumptively applies by extension to aboriginal title
lands. Under s. 18 ofthelndianAct, 30 reserve lands are held "for the use
and benefit" of the band and may be used "for any other purpose for the
general welfare of the band." Nothing in this section suggests that the
band's "general welfare" should be defined narrowly in terms of aboriginal practices prior to European contact rather than the present-day
needs of aboriginal communities. 31
This conclusion is supported by the Indian Oil and Gas Act, 32 whose
overall purpose is to provide for the exploitation of oil and gas on reserve lands that have been surrendered to the Crown. 33 In Delgamuukw,
the Court holds that this statute presumes that title to reserve lands
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includes mineral rights. 34 Since aboriginal title is the same as reserve
title, aboriginal title must also encompass mineral rights. In effect,
lands held pursuant to aboriginal title may be exploited for their oil and
gas in the same way as reserves--regardless whether or not this was a
traditional use of those lands. The Court also quotes s. 6(2) of the Indian Oil and Gas Act, which provides:

I

Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to abrogate the rights oflndian people or preclude them from negotiating for oil and gas benefits in those areas in which land claims have not been settled.
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The Court observes that the areas referred to in this section must include lands held under aboriginal title, since by definition these lands
have not been surrendered to the Crown under treaties or land claims
settlements. So, s. 6(2) presumes that aboriginal title permits the development of oil and gas reserves. 35
This conclusion is significant. It suggests that an aboriginal group
may exploit the mineral resources on its lands without necessarily having to surrender the lands to the Crown, so long as the process does
not involve the transfer of land to third parties or sever the group's
original connection with the land (as discussed below). In other words,
although the Indian Oil and Gas Act envisages the surrender of reserve
lands in order to facilitate their exploitation for oil and gas, there appears to be no reason in principle why such a surrender is necessary under the common law of aboriginal title.
2 . The inherent limit on uses

In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court holds that lands held pursuant to
aboriginal title cannot be used in a manner that is "irreconcilable with
the nature of the attachment to the land that forms the basis of the particular group's aboriginal title."36 If an aboriginal group wants to use its
lands in a way that aboriginal title does not permit, it has to surrender
the lands to the Crown and convert them into non-title lands.37
The scope of this limitation has to be understood in light of its rationale. Chief Justice Lamer explains that aboriginal peoples have a
special bond with the land, as evidenced by the central place that the
land typically occupies in their cultures. For most aboriginal groups,
the land is more than just a fungible commodity; it has an inherent and
unique value quite apart from its economic value. The law of aboriginal
title gives effect to that special bond by recognizing the importance of
continuity in the relationship between an aboriginal group and its land,
and the need for that relationship to endure into the future. As a result,
uses of the land that would jeopardize that relationship are ruled out. 38
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In other words, aboriginal title does not permit uses that would defeat
the title's fundamental basis and rationale, which is to preserve the
land for future generations. An aboriginal group has the responsibility
to ensure that its basic bond with the land is maintained.
How can we determine which uses of the land are legitimate and
which are illegitimate? The key lies in the nature of the aboriginal
group's historic occupation of the land, as determined by the activities
that have taken place on the land and the uses to which the land has
been put, as well as by the group's traditional laws governing land. 39
The Court does not indicate what precise historical period is relevant
in this context. However, since the Court later holds that aboriginal title arises at the time the Crown gains sovereignty, it seems to follow
that the basic character of the relationship is established in the period
succeeding sovereignty rather than at the time of European contact. 40
It bears remembering that a snapshot of aboriginal land uses at a single
point in time is usually insufficient to capture the full range and depth
of a group's ties with its land. A well-rounded account of that relationship will normally have to draw on a relatively lengthy historical period
that embraces the full range of climatic, ecological and other conditions
with which a group has to cope.
Unfortunately, the concept of an inherent limit on uses is open to
misinterpretation. It could be read as reintroducing by the back door
the concept of historically-based uses, which the Court has just rejected. The Chief] ustice is clearly aware of this danger and goes out of his
way to ward it off:
This is not, I must emphasize, a limitation that restricts the use of
the land to those activities that have traditionally been carried out
on it. That would amount to a legal straitjacket on aboriginal peoples who have a legitimate legal claim to the land. The approach I
have outlined above allows for a full range of uses of the land, subject only to an overarching limit, defined by the special nature of
the aboriginal title in that land. 41
The Chief Justice gives some concrete examples that help clarify
his point. He notes that where an aboriginal group's historical occupation was based on hunting the group cannot now use the land in a
way that destroys its value as a hunting-ground, such as by subjecting
it to strip-mining. Again, if a group's bond with the land is basically
ceremonial or cultural, the group may not use the land in such a way
as to sever that bond, as for example by turning the land into a parking lot.42 What these examples show is that the inherent limit precludes uses that are completely incompatible with the original
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relationship. However, the inherent limit does not rule out uses that
are merely unfavourable to the relationship, so long as they do not destroy it. Moreover, the inherent limit does not prevent part of the lands
from being devoted to inconsistent uses, so long as the original relationship can be maintained on other portions of the land. The inherent limit promotes an_3.Rp.r_apri.ate-balanc-.e--in-~he--U·Ses-0Ltlte_)~,!ld
rather th~p _a._rigid adherence to --eriginal uses. This interpretation is
'Support~d by the analogy that the Court draws with the English common law doctrine of "equitable waste." According to that doctrine,
persons who hold a life estate in real property cannot commit "wanton or extravagant acts of destruction" or "ruin the property." The
Chief Justice explains that these sorts of limits capture what he has
in mind here. 43
In effect then, the inherent limit operates only at a very basic level. In most cases, it would not prevent an aboriginal group from putting its lands to a full range of modern uses, so long as these uses do
not destroy the land or prevent the group's elemental bond with the
land from continuing. For example, a group that traditionally used its
land exclusively for hunting, fishing and gathering might devote the
land to a mix of residential, agricultural, dairy, commercial, industrial
and resource-based uses, so long as these uses did not rule out the
possibility of hunting, fishing and gathering in some sectors of the territory. It would not be necessary for hunting, fishing and gathering to be
possible throughout the entire territory, for that would preclude most
other uses. Nor would it be necessary for these traditional activities to
be pursuable at the same level of intensity or with the same freedom
as in former years. Clearly, the conversion of land to residential, agricultural or industrial purposes may reduce the opportunity for traditional pursuits, and conservation measures may reduce th at
opportunity even further. However, so long as an aboriginal group ensures that some reasonable opportunity is afforded for traditional pursuits, the criterion will be satisfied.
One important point emerges from the Court's two-fold analysis
of aboriginal title. Under the first principle, aboriginal title is a uniform
right, which does not vary from group to group. It gives aboriginal
groups the right to the exclusive use and possession of their lands, regardless of differences among groups in their historical patterns ofland
use. In all cases, aboriginal groups are entitled to use the land for a
broad range of contemporary purposes. Nevertheless, the second principle introduces an element of historical particularity. An aboriginal
group cannot use its land in a way that is fundamentally irreconcilable
with its original relationship with the land, a relationship that may differ from group to group.
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Aboriginal Custom
What role does aboriginal custom play in this scheme? The answer lies
in the fact that, while the doctrine of aboriginal title governs the rights
of an aboriginal group considered as a collective unit, it does not regulate
the rights of group members among themselve·s. The latter are governed
by rules distinctive to the group, as originally laid down by custom. 44
· The doctrine of aboriginal title recognizes a communal title with
certain general features. Apart from the inherent limit on uses, the
character of this communal title is not governed by traditional conceptions or practices and so does not vary from group to group. However,
the rights of individuals and corporate entities within the group are determined inter se, not by the doctrine of aboriginal title, but by internal
rules originally grounded in custom. These rules dictate the extent to
which any individual, family, lineage, clan or other sub-group has rights
to possess and use lands vested in the entire group.45 While the rules
have a customary base, they are not necessarily static. 46 They are open
to both formal and informal change, in accordance with shifting group
attitudes, needs and practices. 47
These considerations explain why a group may hold aboriginal title at Canadian common law even if traditionally it had no notion of
private land ownership. So long as the group satisfies the common law
criteria for aboriginal title, it has a communal title to its lands. The fact
that group custom does not acknowledge private ownership may be relevant in determining the rights of individual group members, but it
does not affect the title of the group as a whole. The same considerations support the conclusion that aboriginal title is not confined to
"traditional" uses ofland. 48 The doctrine of aboriginal title attributes to
an aboriginal group a sphere of autonomy, whereby it can determine
freely how to use its lands, so long as it does not sever its basic relationship with the land. Traditional conceptions may influence the
group's decisions, but current needs and attitudes will likely play as
strong a role.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Delgamuukw, some courts
had expressed the view that an aboriginal group is permanently limited in its use of aboriginal lands to customary practices followed at a
distant historical period, such as the time the Crown first acquired
sovereignty. 49 On this supposition, aboriginal title is like an historical
diorama in an old-fashioned museum. Here, a smiling maiden strips
birch-bark from a tree; there, a sturdy warrior aims bow and arrow at
a mildewed deer; while in the corner, a youngster plucks plastic blueberries from a withered bush. We must, of course, disregard the next
display, where a group of hunters plant their first crop of corn under
the glassy eye of a black-robed missionary. If an aboriginal group did
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not practise agriculture traditionally, it is now forbidden. The difficulty with this conception, of course, is that aboriginal people are not
waxen figures on display for tourists but living people who depend on
the land for their livelihood. Any rule that would hold them in permanent bondage to outmoded practices must be viewed with skepticism.
The history-bound view apparently drew on English rules under
which a party asserting a customary right must show that the custom
has existed from "time immemorial" which, for curious reasons, is associated with the year 1189. However, the analogy is inappropriate. As
we have seen, the doctrine of aboriginal rights is not based on English
common law but arose in response to quite different historical conditions in North America. Indeed, it would have been contrary to imperial interests in America to confine aboriginal land uses to those
existing at the time of contact. The European fur trade, which was central to the development of Canada, depended on the activities of aboriginal hunters and trappers whose practices had changed considerably
since pre-European times. 50 When colonial officials, in other contexts,
urged certain hunting groups to take up farming, they were not sanctioning an unlawful use of land.
We must guard against the notion that aboriginal societies are essentially static in nature, that the only true aboriginal land uses are
those that were practised "aboriginally." In fact, of course, aboriginal
societies have often been characterized by their ability to adapt to shifting circumstances in a highly flexible manner. Without this flexibility,
they would often have had little chance of survival. 51 Significant changes in aboriginal life-styles occurred in pre-European times, and further
changes took place in response to European contact. Such adaptations
did not entail the abandonment of a group's essential identity, any
more than Europeans lost their identity when they adopted federalism,
took up lacrosse or started cultivating potatoes, corn and tomatoes. 52
The better view, then, is that taken by the Supreme Court in the Delgamuukw case. Aboriginal title gives a group the right to the exclusive use
and occupation of their land and the right "to use it according to their
own discretion," 53 subject only to the need to maintain their basic link
with the land.

Aboriginal Title as a Property Right
Aboriginal title is a true property right that may be maintained against
the whole world, including the Crown. It is not held at the Crown's
pleasure and it cannot be extinguished by a unilateral Crown act under
the royal prerogative. 54 Where aboriginal title has been extinguished
by valid legislation, it benefits from the common law rule requiring
just compensation.
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The royal prerogative consists of certain powers held by the Crown
under the common law, which may be exercised apart from Parliament. 55 Prerogative powers should be distinguished from powers
awarded to the Crown by statute. The legal character of a Crown act,
such as an order-in-council or letters patent, depends on the source of
the power to enact it. If the power stems from the common law, the act
is a prerogative instrument. If the power is based on legislation, the act
has the character of a statutory instrument.
Where the Crown issues a prerogative grant with respect to land
burdened by aboriginal title, the grant does not extinguish aboriginal
ti~le. The Crown holds only an underlying title to aboriginal lands and
cannot grant more than it possesses. To the extent that the grant purports to extinguish aboriginal title, it is ineffective. 56 Where the grant
is based on statutory authority rather than the royal prerogative, its impact on aboriginal title depends on such factors as the competence of
the enacting legislature; the clarity of the legislative provisions; the
terms of the grant; and the effect of such constitutional instruments as
the Royal Proclamation of 1763, s. 91 (24) of the Constitution Act, 1867
ands. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.57
At one time, the effect of prerogative acts was less certain than it
is today. 58 In St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen, the Privy
Council said that Indian title held under the Royal Proclamation of 1763
was "dependent upon the good will of the Sovereign." 59 The statement
was not explained and was not necessary to the decision. Nevertheless,
it implied that Indian title was akin to a mere licence to use the land,
which the Crown could unilaterally revoke at any time by prerogative
act. 60 However, in the Calder case, 61 the Supreme Court moved in the direction ofrecognizing aboriginal title as a full legal right. Although Justice Judson merely repeated the Privy Council's statement, 62 Justice
Hall adopted a well-defined position. He wrote:
when the Nishga people came under British sovereignty ... they
· were entitled to assert, as a legal right, their Indian title. It being a
legal right, it could not thereafter be extinguished except by surrender to the Crown or by competent legislative authority, and
then only by specific legislation. 63
According to this view, aboriginal title could only be extinguished by a
voluntary surrender or by legislation. By implication, it could not be extinguished by a unilateral exercise of the prerogative.
This position was endorsed by the Supreme Court in the Guerin
case. Justice Dickson stated that in Calder "this Court recognized aboriginal title as a legal right derived from the Indians' historic occupa-
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tion and possession of their tribal lands," and he noted that "Judson
and HallJJ. were in agreement ... that aboriginal title existed in Canada
(at least where it has not been extinguished by appropriate legislative action) ... " 64 Justice Dickson also adopted the view that the Indians were
"the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to
retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion
••• " 65 In her separate opinion,] ustice Wilson explicitly held that the Indian interest "cannot be derogated from or interfered with by the
Crown's utilization of the land for purposes incompatible with the Indian title unless, of course, the Indians agree." 66 In an important passage, she observed:
It seems to me that the "political trust" line of authorities is clearly
distinguishable from the present case because Indian title has an
existence apart altogether from s. 18(1) of the Indian Act. It would
fly in the face of the clear wording of the section to treat that interest as
terminable at will by the Crown without recourse by the Band. 67

1.'
I

!•

i

i

It might be thought obvious that aboriginal title is a property right.
Yet this conclusion has sometimes been doubted. 68 Once again, the
confusion stems in part from the St. Catherine's case, where the Privy
Council, in an unfortunate phrase, described Indian title as a "personal
and usufructuary right." 69 This statement could be taken as suggesting
that aboriginal title is a right held in some personal capacity against the
Crown rather than a property right. However, the Privy Council subsequently disavowed this interpretation in the Star Chrome case, where it
explained that Indian title is "a personal right in the sense that it is in
its nature inalienable except by surrender to the Crown." 10 In other
words, aboriginal title is a "personal" right only in the sense that it is
exclusive to the group that holds it and cannot be transferred to private
individuals. 71 Nevertheless, it could be argued that the restriction on
the transfer of aboriginal title prevents it from being truly proprietary
in nature, since a property right is characteristically alienable. However,
the argument is misconceived. While there may be grounds in English
law for associating property with alienability, the two are not necessarily linked. 72 In any case, aboriginal title is not a category of English land
law but a sui generis right. As seen above, the restriction on alienability
stemmed historically from the rule prevailing in settler communities
that title to land flows from the Crown. This restriction is only partial,
for aboriginal title may be ceded to the Crown and possibly also toother aboriginal groups.
Properly understood, the St. Catherine's case stands for the proposition that aboriginal title is a property right. The Privy Council held
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that Indian title is an "Interest other than that of the Province" in lands
allotted to a Province bys. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867. 73 Thus, the
Crown in right of the Province holds only the underlying title to lands
affected by aboriginal title until aboriginal title is surrendered to the
Crown in right of the Federal Government, at which point the lands become available to the Province as a source of revenue. As the Privy
Council later observed, the phrase an "Interest other than that of the
Province" in s. 109 denotes "some right or interest in a third party, independent of and capable of being vindicated in competition with the
beneficial interest of the old province. " 74 It follows that Indian title is
an interest in land, independent of and opposable to the Crown's underlying title, which it burdens.
In Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul, 75 the Supreme Court removed any
remaining doubts on the question. In a unanimous opinion, the Court
stated:
Before turning to the jurisprudence on what must be done in order
to extinguish the Indian interest in land, the exact nature of that
interest must be considered. Courts have generally taken as their
starting point the case of St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The
Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.), in which Indian title was described at p. 54 as a "personal and usufructuary right." This has at
times been interpreted as meaning that Indian title is merely a personal right which cannot be elevated to the status of a proprietary
interest so as to compete on an equal footing with other proprietary interests. However, we are of the opinion that the right was
characterized as purely personal for the sole purpose of emphasizing its generally inalienable nature; it could not be transferred,
sold or surrendered to anyone other than the Crown.
The Court went on to quote, with approval, Justice Wilson's statement
in the Guerin case that the Crown cannot derogate from the Indian interest in land unless the Indians agree. 76
The fact that aboriginal title is an interest in land means that it
benefits from the common law presumption favouring the payment of
just compensation upon a compulsory taking. In the absence of clear
words to the contrary, statutes that unilaterally extinguish aboriginal
land rights should be interpreted as providing for compensation. 77 The
concept that aboriginal title is a compensable right is not a refinement
of modern jurisprudence. It is intrinsic to the characterization of aboriginal title in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Indian lands are defined
there as "such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having
been ceded to, or purchased by Us, are reserved to them .... " The Crown
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provides that "if, at any Time, any of the said Indians should be inclined
to dispose of the said Lands, the same shall be purchased only for Us, in
Our Name, at some publick Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians
to be held for that Purpose ... " These provisions portray aboriginal title
as a valuable interest in land normally acquired by purchase, which involves the payment of a monetary consideration. It follows that, where
the Crown does not buy Indian lands for a mutually agreed price but
expropriates them, the act will be governed by the normal presumption requiring payment of just compensation.
In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court explicitly confirms this viewpoint. In discussing the Crown's fiduciary duty under s. 35(1), Constitution Act, 1982, the Court holds that aboriginal title has an inescapable
economic aspect. As such, fair compensation is normally required
when aboriginal title is infringed, depending on such factors as the nature of the aboriginal title in question, the nature and severity of the
infringement, and the extent to which aboriginal interests have been
accommodated. 78 Although the Court is discussing the implications of
the Crown's fiduciary duty under s. 35(1), it appears that s. 35 (1)
merely entrenches a common law duty that predated the enactment of
the Constitution Act, 1982. 79
In summary, the concept of aboriginal title is a distinctive concept
of Canadian common law that coordinates the interaction between indigenous land systems and European-based land systems. Aboriginal
title arises from the occupation of Canada by indigenous peoples prior
to the advent of the Crown. It is a communal title and cannot be alienated except to the Crown. It gives a group the right to the exclusive use
and occupation of the land for a broad range of purposes, so long as
these are not irreconcilable with the group's original bond with the
land. While the concept of aboriginal title is broadly uniform in nature,
it allows for differing systems of land use and tenure to operate within
aboriginal groups. Aboriginal title is a true property right, maintainable
against the whole world, including the Crown. It is not held at the
Crown's pleasure and it cannot be extinguished by a unilateral exercise
of the Crown prerogative. Where aboriginal title has been extinguished
by the act of a competent legislature, it benefits from the common law
presumption ordaining the payment of just compensation.
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313 (S.C.C.) at 328. Likewise, in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3
S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.) at 1081, the Supreme Court stated that "the Privy
Council's choice of terminology is not particularly helpful to explain the
various dimensions of aboriginal title." Significantly, the Privy Council itself disclaimed any intention of giving a comprehensive definition oflndian
title (at 55): "There was a great deal of learned discussion at the Bar with
respect to the precise quality of the Indian right, but their Lordships do not
consider it necessary to express any opinion upon the point."
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sense that it cannot be transferred to a grantee .... " The Supreme Court confirms this view in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010
(S.C.C.) at 1081-82.
72 As noted in K. Lysyk, "The Indian Title Question in Canada: An Appraisal
in the Light of Calder" (1973) 51 Can. Bar. Rev. 450 at 471: "restrictions on
alienation are familiar to recognized interests in land at common law, for
example, in leases or in estates in fee tail. As one writer has observed, at
English common law there were times when most of the land in England
could not be sold to anyone" (footnotes omitted).
73 St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 A.C. 46 (P.C.)
at 58.
74 Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario [1897] A.C. 199
. (P.C.) at 210-11.
75 Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654 (S.C.C.) at 677.
76 Ibid. at 677, quoting Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (S.C.C.) at
349. See also Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.)
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at 1081-82, citing Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654 (S.C.C.)
at 677.
77 In Paul v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. (1983), 2 D.L.R. 22 (N.B.C.A.), La Forest,J.A.
states at 34: "When a taking is, in fact, authorized by statute, it is presumed
that compensation will be paid .... This, like the presumption against taking, must apply with additional force to the taking oflndian lands because
this affects the honour and good faith of the Crown." For discussion, see B.
Slattery, "The Constitutional Guarantee of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights"
(1982-83) 8 Queen's L.J. 232 at 270-73 .
78 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.) at 1113-14.
79 In his separate opinion, justice La Forest notes that the treatment of aboriginal title as a compensable right is evident in the Royal Proclamation of 1763;
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.) at 1133-34.
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